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 The debt problem in the eurozone cannot be avoided or hoped away. 
The article examines different opportunities of dealing with the debt burden. 
There are many options how to address the debt problem. Due to dramatic 
circumstances a number of modifications to the original rules of the SGP 
such as the Six-Pack, Two-Pack and Fiscal compact became politically 
acceptable. However, budget stabilization cannot work for a long time in the 
southern EU countries being permanently in recession. There are several 
ways how to lower the debt burden - higher inflation, various types of state 
bankruptcies, federalization of Europe and takeover of the debt by a 
common fiscal authority or an institutional solution that requires only 
minimal adaptation of the existing institutional structure of the EU. The 
latter one being a permanent "burial" of the excessive part of current debt on 
the balance sheet of the ECB. Under certain conditions it is possible to 
design this solution as non-inflationary and by exclusion of the risk of future 
moral hazard in public debt incensement. The main objective of the authors 
is to describe possible ways to reduce debt burden building on the overview 
of empirical and comparative analyses available in international literature. 
The authors come to the conclusion that new framework for dealing with 
debt burden will be necessary in order to eliminate persisting obstacle 
hindering economic growth. The most feasible solution being the one put 
forward by Paris and Wyplosz. Its main asset lies in the fact that the transfer 
of debt burden is limited to the future generations of one country. Thus the 
political sensitivity of higher extent of risk-sharing among eurozone 
countries and lack of willingness to accept bolder solutions in this respect is 
overcome. All alternatives mentioned in the text remain highly complex 
which will make it difficult for national policy makers to obtain support for 
                                                          
13 This article is based on the paper presented at the "Economic Policy in the European 
Union Member Countries" conference held in Soláň 2.9 - 4. 9. 2015 
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adoption of such measures among the EU citizens at individual country 
level. 
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Introduction  
 The debt crisis in the eurozone reached a stage where some 
politicians talk optimistically about managing the situation by a number of 
institutional arrangements. The effectiveness of these measures though - 
whether it is the fiscal compact and the establishment of a banking union - is 
very controversial, just because of the particular setting of those measures. 
High levels of national debt would - without other measures to be 
simultaneously taken - greatly complicate and limit future economic growth. 
The aim of the following article is to explore ways how to reduce the 
national debt to a level that would not limit the future growth of the EU 
economy. This will be done by way of empirical and comparative analysis of 
proposals put forward so far by the experts in the international literature.  
 
Public debt, deficits and contemporary institutional framework for debt 
sustainability in the EU   
 The fiscal rules for the EU - both fiscal criteria of the Maastricht 
Treaty and later the Stability and Growth Pact - have always contained a 
number of restrictions under which they perform their original purpose 
which is to preserve sound public finances in EMU. The first limitation is 
related to the assumptions and theories on which the value of the "right 
amount" limit of deficits and public debt (3%, or 60% respectively) were set 
arbitrarily. They were derived in the 1990th on the basis of so-called 
budgetary arithmetics (or debt arithmetics) for growth parameters of the EU 
back than and extrapolated on to the future. EU at this time consisted of 12 
member states and the growing trend in the nominal rate reached 5 % per 
year. This use of the "debt arithmetic" approach did led to "one-size-fits-all" 
parametric rule in public finance. These criteria were too tight for fast 
growing converging economies, while for stagnating countries, on the 
contrary, these criteria were very loose. One can, however, argue that the 
simplicity and clarity of the rules are - as the theory postulates - sufficient 
justification for this simplified mechanistic approach in fiscal arithmetics. 
Stability and Growth Pact did not only kept those rules but also added 
the medium term objectives which obliged the member states to achieve 
nearly balanced budgets in the medium term. The term of reporting about the 
implementation of these objectives and planning were (and are) the 
convergence (for countries with a derogation in the Euro adoption) and 
stability (for countries using the Euro) programs that the member states 
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periodically submit to the European Commission. Right from the start, 
however, the system had a large deficit in the options to enforce compliance 
with the rules and the enforcement of sanctions. In the wake of the 
introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact into practice the two key major 
economies - Germany and France - have failed in respecting the public 
budget deficit criterion. The voting system set in the Council has led to the 
fact that finally, in 2003, these countries were not even sanctioned by the 
covenant anticipated in the corrective part of the Pact. A second major 
limitation was therefore the enforceable compliance with these rules 
including the application of sanctions. At that nothing has changed, not even 
by a slight modification of the Pact, adopted in 2005. 
The so-called debt part of the Pact – stating that overreaching the 60 
% debt to GDP ratio is only possible provided that the debt to GDP ratio is 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace – remained completely 
overlooked. Among the highly indebted eurozone economies only Belgium 
managed to reach the needed primary surpluses in the pre-crisis period. Italy 
has not acted that way and Greece and Portugal did not reach even positive 
primary surpluses. And that is more or less benevolently taken into account 
by other signatories of the Pact and without any reflection of the different 
risk of sovereign debt by financial markets. 
The debt crisis in the eurozone brought a number of measures which 
were enforced by the circumstances - in addition to the partial restructuring 
of Greek debt, “politically correctly” known as PSI (Private Sector 
Involvement), together with official assistance of Troika (Official Sector 
Involvement), followed by assistance to other states such as Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and by extraordinary measures by the ECB pursuing stabilization of 
market access in bond markets for Spain, Portugal and Italy14.  
Due to these dramatic circumstances a number of modifications to the 
original rules of the Pact such as the Six-Pack, Two-Pack and Fiscal compact 
became politically acceptable. (Dědek, 2013; Wawrosz, 2013). Disciplinary 
elements were included into the preventive branch of the Pact. Member 
states which do not fulfill their mid-term objectives are newly subject to 
additional duty of keeping prudent growth of their budget expenditures. 
Violation is punishable under precisely defined quantitative terms. In the 
corrective arm of the Pact numerical rules to reduce excessive debt were 
introduced; the reverse qualified majority voting in the Council made a very 
important change too. 
                                                          
14 Solution of the insolvency of banks in Cyprus, where by the principle of bail-in was used 
first will be left aside as this article focuses on the issue of sovereign debt, not the 
restructuring of the banking sector, although these issue are potentially closely related. 
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Institutional rules for fiscal policy thus became stricter and – thanks 
to the measures described above – their proper enforcement is more likely. In 
the meantime though, sovereign debts in the EU has grown to such a height 
that their repayment by these rules may make future economic growth 
impossible, see for example (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Wyplosz, 2012) 
among others. The following chart shows the development of the debt in the 
eurozone as a whole; its decomposition is shown in table 1: 
Fig. 1: General government debt in the euro area 
 
 
Source: Key indicators for the euro area, DG ECFIN July 2015 
 
Tab. 1: General government debt in the euro area Countries 





















Source: Key indicators for the euro area, DG ECFIN July 2015 
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An increase in economic growth is the only sustainable way to debt 
reduction. But such high debt levels, that we can see in the table, have 
operated through various channels to limit growth possibilities. Efforts to 
reduce public debt ratio through fiscal austerity have had virtually no success 
since austerity curtails nominal GDP growth (Malý, 2013).  
 
Alternative ways of reducing the debt to a level not limiting economic 
growth 
 As we can see in the chart for the euro area and in the table that 
provides information on the level of debt in the Member States, the total debt 
in the euro area greatly exceeds the rate of 60 % and is approaching the 100 
percentage of GDP. The problem is not present just in the countries of the 
southern wing of the EU but it also affects Germany and France where the 
debt ratio increased by approximately 20 % of GDP during the Great 
Recession. 
Strict adherence to fiscal rules in the first seven years of the past 
decade might have probably helped the euro area avoid a debt crisis. 
However, strict compliance to the fiscal rules by the current levels of debt 
may lead the more indebted countries to a position similar to that of Greece 
which (even after the debt haircut and implementation of fiscal reforms) is 
generating primary budget surpluses but where its debt / GDP ratio has 
increased to a staggering 177% due to the decline in GDP (Zettelmeyer et al., 
2013) 
Economic theory and the theory of economic policy know several 
alternative pathways how to reduce debt to a level that would not limit 
economic growth. These are: (i) reduction of the relative value of debt due to 
higher inflation or (ii) default and debt restructuring associated not only with 
changes in maturity of the debt but even with partial haircut of the debt 
burden. As indicated in Miller and Thomas (2013) approximately 190 cases 
of restructuring of sovereign debt associated with the exchange of debt and 
its partial forgiveness can be found in the world only from 1950 to the 
present. The size of the haircut varies within a wide range though. 
Oosterlinck (Oosterlinck, 2013) reported the range of 13-78 % of the original 
value of the debt. The variety of ways of restructuring is actually very wide, 
particularly in the way of its realization. Because there is no universally 
accepted international bankruptcy law on public debt, each solution chosen 
has basically been original (Mody, 2013). For the purposes of this article, we 
use the subdivision proposed in the article by Miller and Thomas as a 
possible solution for the eurozone. These are the options: (i) creation of a 
comprehensive legal and institutional framework for dealing with state 
bankruptcy (for the euro area the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism is 
suggested), (ii) the purely contractual or "market driven" approach to 
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sovereign bankruptcy, (iii) one-time solutions for some form of a 
"supranational special purpose vehicle" or (iiii)  combination of contracts 
and statutory intervention (e.g. GDP bonds or one-time solutions for some 
form of a "supranational special purpose vehicle"). Finally, the fifth and 
most challenging proposal (v) taking on the federal level and fiscal 
centralization has to be pointed out (the formation of common federal budget 
as mentioned in: Bargain at al., 2013) 
As can be inferred from the current developments in the euro area the 
first and the fourth option seem not to be politically feasible, at least in the 
short or medium term.  
In 2010, with the aim of securing permanent resolution framework 
the European Crisis Resolution Framework, so-called ECRM was discussed. 
Newly proposed institutional structure was supposed to resolve the issue of 
restructuring outstanding public debt. Concerted action of three bodies – 
legal (in the form of specialized chamber of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in charge of legal aspects, especially litigation and formal 
agreement), economic (encompassing representatives of the European 
Commission and the ECB responsible for economic assessment) and 
financial (providing financial support) could according to its authors replace 
Paris Club discussions. (Gianviti at el., 2010) Two shortcomings of this 
solution are widely recognized. Firstly, its intrusiveness, secondly the non-
existence of statutory priority structure, that makes it difficult to determine 
the order of priorities. However, during the crisis some elements of the 
ECRM materialized; financial institutions providing support were 
established as well as semi-informal set of rules for engagement of the 
institutions and eventually framework for liquidity support was developed. 
(Miller and Thomas, 2013).  
In this context, it must be pointed out that existing solutions for 
countries with problems (especially in Greece and Cyprus) were finally - as 
an ad hoc response to a problem approached way too late – a combination of 
contractual (or market driven) solutions with "statutory intervention" when 
supranational institutions enforce and coordinate a way to deal with the 
situation when it already was "too late". 
Some experts point to the fact, that so far approximately 190 debt 
exchanges were carried out, without the assistance of international 
bankruptcy court for sovereigns or international legal framework and 
therefore emphasize the role of the markets. (Miller and Thomas, 2013) 
Important substance of market driven approach are Collective Action 
Clauses allowing for certain quorum of bondholders to modify the payment 
and non-payment terms. They can also permit the aggregation across all of 
the sovereign’s bond issuances. Hence, in case of meeting the necessary 
conditions, the agreement on restructuration of debt becomes binding for all 
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bondholders. Nevertheless the risk of holdouts is never entirely eliminated. 
In Greece the litigation was mitigated by repaying them in full unlike in 
Argentina. (Miller and Thomas, 2013).   
Newly emerging options mentioned by Miller and Thomas include 
statutory provisions and new market initiatives. In their view the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (the ESM) shall be amended 
in order to prevent seizure of the sovereign’s assets receiving the ESM 
assistance by the holdouts that refuse to participate in the debt restructuring. 
(for more details see Buchheit et al., 2013) The modification of the Treaty 
would also oblige the ESM members to implement new legislation at 
national level. Even though the risk of holdouts and litigation would 
probably be significantly reduced, it could never be entirely excluded. 
(Miller and Thomas, 2013) They also mention the argument by Flandreau 
that other important factor is creditor coordination underpinned by 
institutional interventions in the market. (Flandreau, 2013 in Miller, Thomas, 
2013) Another innovative solution to be combined with the previous ones 
proposed by the two experts being the issuance of GDP bonds that would 
pay back higher rate of interest, if GDP rises over certain threshold at the 
time of repayment or lower interest rate if the threshold is not reached 
(for more details see for e.g. Choi et al., 2011; Shiller, 2003). 
The introduction of such an instrument could be underpinned by 
establishment of special purpose vehicle at EU level that would buy 
individual country debt and issue eurobonds. Such an institution could 
pioneer new instrument, GDP bond, at wider level. (Miller and Thomas, 
2013) 
Paris and Wyplosz (2014) suggest a sophisticated, yet relatively 
simple way how to (hopefully) make it politically possible to create a 
supranational special purpose vehicle and to avoid the problem of moral 
hazard where less responsible governments produce excessive amounts of 
new debt.  
This proposal is based on the assumption that it is possible to plan an 
orderly debt restructuring in the eurozone without any redistribution among 
countries. A creation of an SPV (which may be the ECB) is also a part of this 
proposal. This SPV would take over the existing public debt at nominal 
value and convert them to a zero return perpetuity. The SPV raises capital in 
the public markets to buy these government bonds and repays their interest. 
This generates a loss in the range of the interest. Seigniorage may be used to 
pay this loss. The main, and only, merit is that a portion of public debt is not 
traded any more. 
„The way to eliminate politically unacceptable inter-country transfers 
is to require that the agency acquires and swaps public debts of all eurozone 
member countries in proportion to each country’s share of its capital, which 
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determines how profits and losses are passed on to governments. This feature 
means that, over time, each government will ‘pay back’ the agency, over the 
indefinite future, the total amount – in the present value sense – of the initial 
debt cancellation in the form of reduced distributed profits. The debt 
restructuring thus amounts to a transfer of the debt burden from current to 
future generations within each country, without any transfer from one 
country to another or from current debt holders.“ (Paris and Wyplosz, 2014) 
Then the crucial issue of moral hazard appears. The proposal 
specifies that, should a country accumulate debt again, the agency is 
obligated to swap the zero-interest national perpetuities back into interest-
yielding bonds. Such an action which is bound to trigger strong market 
reactions should deter governments from sliding again into fiscal 
indiscipline. 
What concerns the boldest step consisting in the introduction of 
common eurozone fiscal capacity or common federal budget, this solution is 
frequently mentioned in the discussion about resolution of the crisis and 
shortcomings of the eurozone economic governance and various suggestions 
have already been put forward. However, the progress in this respect remains 
limited mainly due to the obstacles at political level.  
If we look at the first section of this article, it is obvious that solution 
of some form will have to be adopted in order to mitigate negative effects of 
high levels of public debt. In the light of the solutions that have been put 
forward by the experts outlined in the second section, the prospects of 
finding easy solution in the short run remain grim. In the medium term some 
combination of the above mentioned solutions will have to be put in practice. 
From the point of the view of the authors the solution proposed by Paris and 
Wyplosz seems to be of the greatest relevance as the transfer of debt burden 
is limited to the future generations of one country. Thus, the political 
sensitivity of higher extent of risk-sharing among eurozone countries and 
lack of willingness to accept bolder solutions in this respect is overcome. 
 
Conclusion 
 Europe is suffering from a very high level of public debt, which 
threatens the stability of the banking sector and undermines economic 
growth. There are several ways how to eliminate this risk - higher inflation, 
various types of state bankruptcies, federalization of Europe and takeover of 
the debt by a common fiscal authority or an institutional solution that 
requires only minimal adaptation of the existing institutional structure of the 
EU. The latter one being a permanent "burial" of the excessive part of 
current debt on the balance sheet of the ECB. Under certain conditions it is 
possible to design this solution as non-inflationary and by exclusion of the 
risk of future moral hazard in public debt incensement.        
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